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1 Introduction
In development policy and practice, economic
models of 'the household' command considerable
influence. This influence derives primarily from
claims that household models are capable of pre-
dicting policy outcomes.
Until quite recently, the dominant model portrayed
the household as a solidary unit with the prefer-
ences of all household members aggregated in a
joint utility function. This portrayal is not only
analytically convenient. It also implies that subsi-
dies and transfers have the same effect regardless of
whether they are directed to men or women.
Recently the unitary model has come under fire
from within the neoclassical paradigm. The main
thrust of this critique is that individuals should be
characterised by their own preferences, rather than
aggregated within the ad hoc fiction of the unitary
model: 'individualism should be referred to even
when one is modelling household behaviour; that
is, the latter should be explicity recognised as a col-
lective process involving (except for singles) more
than one decision unit' (Chiappori 1992: 440).
Since the rules governing intrahousehold allocation
can assume multiple forms, collective modellers
maintain that the unitary model is simply a special
and peculiar instance of a more general collective
approach.
Collective modellers challenge the policy implica-
tions of the unitary model, and endorse arguments
that resources should be channeled to women on
grounds not only of equity, but also efficiency
Indeed, the neoclassical critique of the unitary
model originates from studies that portray women
as more responsible than men. In short, the altru-
istic male household head of the unitary model
who keeps both 'rotten kids' and 'rotten wives' in
line through strategic transfers (Becker 1981) has
given way to the 'good mother'.
Despite more favourable representations of
women, the deployment of gender in collective
models remains deeply problematic. Taking gender
seriously is not simply a matter of adding women,
recognising their contribution, or being more
generous towards them. Rather, it forces attention
to the exercise of power within and beyond the
household. It also disrupts claims of prediction.
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My purpose in this article is twofold. First is to help
demystify economic models of the household by
making explicit the gendered politics through
which they have been constructed and debated)
These models and the debates that surround them
are gendered in two senses. Household modellers
invoke particular understandings of gender, and the
debates among them enact some of their key
assumptions.
My second purpose is to spell out some of the
implications of attention to gender power. In her
brilliant introduction to Gender and the Politics
of History (1988), Joan Scott makes the point that
gender - in the sense of knowledge about the mul-
tiple and contested meanings of sexual difference -
is not confined to the household, but is invoked
and contested in a variety of institutional arenas as
part of many kinds of struggles for power. This
extended definition of politics is one of the central
insights of feminism, and contains the key to mov-
ing beyond economism. In the second part of the
article, I draw on my research in the Muda region of
Malaysia to illustrate these arguments.
2 From Unitary to Collective
Models of 'the Household': The
Double-Gendered Battlefields of
Knowledge2
'The household' has long been a thorn in the side of
neoclassical economists because it poses the prob-
lem of preference aggregation. In neoclassical the-
ory, consistent preferences are axiomatic and
essential for predictability. Posed most forcefully by
Samuelson (1956) the problem is, how can we
expect family demand functions to obey any con-
sistency conditions? Samuelson viewed the notion
of a household dictatorship with distaste. Instead
he opted for utopian commune in which household
members internalise one another's preferences such
that 'the family acts as if it were maximising their
joint welfare.'
This article is a shortened and substantially rewritten
version of Hart (1995) - a paper produced for an almost
exclusively male conference of development economists.
21 have borrowed the term 'battlefields of knowledge'
from Long and Long (1992).
Non-neoclassical economists who made important
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Rooted in sociobiology the 'Rotten Kid theorem' -
which also encompasses rotten wives - was Gary
Becker's (1981) ingenious device for legitimating
preference aggregation in terms other than domes-
tic dictatorship or conjugal communism. So long as
the household is headed by an altruist 'who cares
sufficiently about other household members to
transfer general resources to them', then no matter
how selfish the kids or wives may be, it will be in
their interests to maximise the welfare of the house-
hold as a whole. Efficient outcomes are thus
achieved through paternalistic manipulation, rather
than through brute force or perfect consensus.
Just when Becker provided an elegant justification,
the unitary model came under fire from some rene-
gade economists who deployed game theory to
develop bargaining models of the household
(Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Homey
1981). These so-called Nash bargaining models are,
as we shall see later, the precursors of the more gen-
eral collective approach, and are firmly within the
neoclassical paradigm. In the bargaining frame-
work, the household is composed of self-interested
individuals who engage in both conflict and coop-
eration. Their relative bargaining power is defined
by 'threat points' or fall-back positions, which
reflect the level of welfare that each could attain if
they fail to cooperate. In these formal renditions,
gender inequality boils down to male-female wage
differentials. Other feminist economists also took
up the cudgels against the unitary model, joined by
a number of anthropologists and sociologists.
While accepting the idea of the household as a site
of both cooperation and conflict, many of these
interventions were also quite critical of economistic
formulations of the bargaining model and suggested
a number of important modifications.
In seeking to fend off the bargaining model chal-
lenge, unitary modellers portrayed themselves and
their opponents in terms that bore a rather uncanny
resemblance to the household altruist trying to cope
with a carping wife. Such interventions were not,
contributions to extending the bargaining framework
include Folbre 1984, 1986a, 1986b; Jones 1983, 1986;
Agarwal 1990; Sen 1990; Kabeer 1991. Anthropologists
and sociologists who contributed to these debates include
for example Whitehead 1981; Guyer 1981; Guyer and
Peters 1987; Dwyer and Bruce 1988; Kandiyoti 1988;
Wolf 1990.
they pointed out, in the interests of the discipline as
a whole since they were 'less parsimonious' (e.g.
Rosenzweig and Schultz 1984). Intra-household
inequality, they insisted, reflected optimal decisions
for the household as a whole, rather than asymmet-
rical bargaining power.
They also rejected arguments that income subsidies
and transfers should be directed to women to
improve their bargaining power; since intra-house-
hold inequalities are functional to the welfare of the
household as a whole, 'person-specific transfer pro-
grams' are simply misguided (e.g. Rosenzweig
1986). The sub-text of these arguments is, of
course, that the (male) household altruist knows
best. In short, assumptions invoked for analytical
convenience overlapped with androcentric
constructions of the household as a natural unit (cf.
Hams 1980) in ways that also informed develop-
ment practice. Writing in the late 1980s, Guyer and
Peters (1987: 210) noted that
Perhaps the most bizarre outcome of over-con-
cretised thinking in development practice is
that 'women' (or less often 'gender') and 'house-
hold' have been dealt with in separate domains
of discourse and action. For example, in
numerous donor agencies 'women's issues' are
ensconced in a specially defined field of
'women in development', whereas households
appear as units of analysis and social units
addressed within substantive fields such as
rural credit, agricultural development, small-
scale enterprise, nutrition, and so forth.
Since 1990, a series of studies based on large-scale
data sets have shattered the image of the household
altruist. These studies show that unearned income
controlled by women is associated with larger
improvements in child health and nutrition than
that accruing to men (Thomas 1990); with greater
reductions in fertility (Schultz 1990); with increases
in the share of the household budget allocated to
health, education, and housing (Thomas 1993);
and with a greater probability that children will
attend school and receive medical attention
(Duraisamy and Malathy 1992 cited by Strauss and
Thomas 1993) - all of which, of course, is
These studies used a measure of unearned income to
avoid the charge that wages and other earnings reflect
human capital.
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inconsistent with the unitary model.4 Critics of the
unitary model had been making these arguments
for some time, but their claims were typically dis-
missed as 'anecdotal' and, by implication, 'femi-
nine'; it required the legitimacy of large, hard data
sets to make them stick.
The new collective models of the household take off
from these portrayals of good mothers and profli-
gate fathers who spend their money on wine,
women, and song. In a somewhat Oedipal drama,
collective modellers represent a group of young
Turks rising up against the patriarchs of the disci-
pline, but doing so in a way that tries to beat them
at their own game. The chief limitation of the uni-
tary model, these rebels argue, is that it 'falls short
of meeting the basic rule of neoclassical micro-eco-
nomic analysis, namely individualism, which obvi-
ously requires each individual to be characterised
by his (her) own preferences, rather than being
aggregated within the ad hoc fiction of the collective
decision unit' (Bourguignon and Chiappori 1992:
356).
Collective modellers explicitly distance themselves
from the 'unitary versus bargaining model' debates
of the 1980s:
While any evidence against income pooling fal-
sifies the traditional approach [i.e. the unitary
model], it certainly does not support any alter-
native model ]i.e. the bargaining model] in par-
ticular. There are certainly hundreds of ad hoc
assumptions that could explain the observed
results within the traditional approach, and
thousands of more or less funny alternative
models that could justify them outside it.
(Bourguignon and Chiappori 1992: 360)
The more general point is that any set of quantita-
tive results is almost always subject to multiple
interpretations.
In challenging the 'traditionalists', collective
modellers depose the unitary model from its
dominant position by defining it as a special
and peculiar case. Indeed, both the unitary and
the Nash bargaining model are simply special
cases of a more general class of cooperative
models. Cooperative models assume full infor-
mation, fully enforceable contracts, and Pareto
efficient resource allocation - i.e. that intra-
household allocational equilibrium is such that
no member can be made better off without any-
one else being made worse off. Non-cooperative
models recognise imperfect information,
enforcement problems, and inefficient resource
allocation. As we shall see later, these distinc-
tions cooperative and non-cooperative models
are indeed far more telling than those between
unitary and bargaining models.
Second, some collective modellers assert superiority
over their traditionalist forebears by claiming to
wield more sophisticated econometric techniques
to implement their more general theory Not only is
the unitary model a special and peculiar case; in
addition, the purveyors of these traditional models
impose strong assumptions about the rules govern-
ing intra-household allocation. Collective modellers
claim to be resolutely agnostic about household
allocative rules; rather than such rules being
imposed, they must be recovered from the data - a
procedure which is, needless to say, more complex
than that deployed by the old unitary modellers.5
Third, they argue that precisely because the unitary
model is such a peculiar and special case, it is likely
to result in a series of policy failures - including the
wrong choice of policy instrument, the inappropri-
ate implementation of a particular policy instru-
ment, and the failure to recognise the variety and
reach of potential policy handles; hence the time
has come to 'shift the burden of proof' (Alderman et
al. 1995, Haddad and Kanbur 1992, Haddad et al.
1997). The bottom line of these arguments, dis-
cussed more fully later, is that resources should be
channeled directly to women.
Yet, as we shall now see, in seeking to confront the
patriarchs on the narrow terrain of neoclassicism,
those who deploy cooperative models to 'recover'
For a lucid description of these procedures see Deaton
(1994).
In studies of French and Canadian data, Bourguignon et
al. (1993) and Browning et al. (1993) reject the income
pooling assumption of the unitary model, but concede
that they were unable to identify the location of the
sharing rule. Deaton and his colleagues, who have
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sharing rules from survey data are hoist with their
own petard. Those who seek to extend the terrain
by devising non-cooperative models very quickly
encounter the limits of economism.
3 The Limits of Economism
On closer inspection, collective modellers' claims to
be able to recover sharing rules from household
survey data turn out to be quite exaggerated.6 In
practice, as some of them concede, their policy
analysis is based on the shortcomings of the unitary
model rather than an estimation of a specific collec.
tive model. Most of these policy claims in fact
derive from the logic of the old Nash bargaining
model.
There are, I suggest, two key sets of problems inher-
ent in collective modellers' attempts to 'recover'
sharing rules from aggregate survey data.7 First,
what is most obviously problematic is that large-
scale survey data collection exercises themselves
embody pre-defined categories and assumptions
about underlying relations. At best, therefore, the
rules that are recovered are likely to be those that
were assumed in the first place. At the most basic
level, precisely what is meant by 'the household' is
far from self-evident particularly in contexts defined
by complex systems of labour circulation and spa-
tially-extended sharing arrangements. More gener-
ally, to view household survey data as objective sets
of facts which, if properly interrogated, will yield
underlying rules, is to engage in a singularly circu-
lar exercise.
Efforts to recover sharing rules are hamstrung in
another key way Despite claims of agnosticism vis-
a-vis sharing rules, collective modellers require
Pareto efficiency in order to implement their proce-
dures; these are, in other words, cooperative mod-
els. Such models are extremely restrictive, and
represent neoclassical economics in its most
orthodox form. They cling to assumptions of per-
fect information and costless enforcement which
worked on data from Africa and Asia, concede that the
results leave much to be desired, and that 'a great deal of
work needs to be done before these methods can be
fruitfully used to investigate intrahousehold allocation'
(Deaton 1995).
These arguments are developed more fully in Hart
(1995).
new institutional economists have relinquished in
their attempts to crack open other black boxes -
notably agrarian institutions (Stiglitz 1989; Bardhan
1989) and firms (Williamson 1985). In short, even
within the confines of mainstream economic theory;
cooperative models of the household are a genera-
tion behind new institutional economics models
which, in turn, invoke quite crude assumptions
about the nature of power relations (Hart 1986;
Bardhan 1989).
Non-cooperative household models do engage with
issues of informational asymmetry and enforcement
costs, and represent the application of the new
institutional economics to the household. Yet in
doing so, they reveal very clearly the limits of
economism.
Two examples of noncooperative models -
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Carter and Katz
(1993, 1997) - illustrate these limits quite clearly.
Lundberg and Pollak (1993: 990) distinguish their
model from the Nash bargaining model in two key
ways. First, the threat point is not divorce but a
noncooperative equilibrium defined in terms of tra-
ditional gender roles and gender expectations.
Second, the non-cooperative equilibrium is not
Pareto optimal, but may be the final one because of
transactions costs. They go on to show how this
model yields predictions of the distributional effects
of child allowances and other family policies which
differ from those of both the Nash bargaining and
the unitary model. This model illustrates two par-
ticularly important points. First is the sensitivity of
conclusions about distributional outcomes to
assumptions about intra-household relations.
Second is the awkwardness of the assumptions. The
level of transfers in the noncooperative, 'voluntary
contribution' equilibrium is 'maintained by social
enforcement of the obligations corresponding to
generally recognised and accepted gender roles'
(Lundberg and Pollak 1993: 994). Yet, as the
authors themselves concede, this ad hoc invocation
of norms and enforcement mechanisms is a cop-
out.
The Carter-Katz model also elaborates the idea of a
domestic economy comprised of separate gender-
defined spheres, but provides a more sophisticated
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analysis of how transfers are mediated. Carter and
Katz envisage household members as being in pos-
session of individual property rights as well as
autonomous control over income and time alloca-
tion. Transfers of resources and labour are mediated
by a conjugal contract (cf. Whitehead 1981), and
are enforceable only at some cost. The conjugal
contract, in turn, is determined by 'voice' - the
degree to which both partners can influence or bar-
gain over net resource transfers - as well as their
respective 'exit' options: 'As fundamentally social
constructions, both voice and exit reflect a complex
of attitudes, mores, and opportunities exogenous to
the household that can be labelled the 'degree of
patriarchy" (Carter and Katz 1993: 7.18).
Carter and Katz's attention to what they call 'voice'
- in other words the capacity to renegotiate the
rules or terms of exchange - represents a major
advance over the Nash bargaining model in which
the rules are given and relative bargaining power is
determined by exogenous threat points (or 'extra-
household environmental parameters'). What this
means in effect is that gender-biased shifts in policy
or in economic opportunities not only have differ-
ential effects on different household members, but
may also provoke a renegotiation of the rules gov-
erning access to and control over resources and
labour, as well as redistribution of the fruits of that
labour. The dynamics of household formation and
partition also hinge crucially on how definitions of
rights and obligations governing relations between
women and men, as well as between elders and
juniors, are renegotiated in relation to larger struc-
tures and processes. Although a notion such as the
'degree of patriarchy' calls attention to the gendered
exercise of power, it is quite incapable of providing
analytical purchase.
The Carter-Katz model represents an effort to for-
malise arguments that some of the critics of econo-
mistic versions of bargaining models have been
making for some time - namely that struggles over
resources, labour, and redistribution are simultane-
ously struggles over culturally-constructed mean-
ings and definitions.8 The basic thrust of
Whitehead's (1981) original and brilliant
formulation of the 'conjugal contract' was that
domestic budgeting is a fundamentally political
8 This panicular formulation, which has now become (1984) and further elaborated by Berry (1988, 1989)
widely accepted, was originally articulated by Peters
process encompassing the power to label and
define; thus, for example, wages or money incomes
earned by women do not necessarily translate into
the same power as those of men because of cultural
practices that define men's and women's incomes as
incommensurate. Likewise, in her discussion of
intra-household 'bargaining' in a Cameroonian rice-
growing scheme Jones (1986) pointed out that:
it is not only the rate of compensation and type
of contractual agreement that are being negoti-
ated but also the meaning of the contractual
arrangement itself. Women are bargaining not
only over the level of the 'wage' they are paid
[by their husbands] but also over their right to
be paid a certain amount based on the level of
their labour input. In effect, they are challeng-
ing the husband's right to dispose of the prod-
uct of his wife's labour, a right which was
recognised heretofore by the transfer of
bridewealth cattle.
(Jones 1986: 118)
Similarly, Carney and Watts (1990) show how a
project designed to intensify rice production in the
Gambia provoked a renegotiation of labour and
property rights between men and women which
undermined the original intent of the project.9
In complementary papers, Henrietta Moore and I
argued that gender needs to be understood as
constitutive of economic processes; and that the
key to doing so lies in incorporating insights from
cultural studies - in particular, the ways that cul-
turally-constructed and gendered meanings both
inform and are shaped by everyday practices both
within and beyond the household (Hart 1992;
Moore 1992). Since meanings - such as those asso-
ciated with intrahousehold exchanges or claims on
resources or, indeed, the boundaries of 'the house-
hold' - are multiple, contested, and change over
time, outcomes cannot be predicted from 'rules' or
norms. Moore makes the crucially important point
that conventions are best thought of as resources
that are drawn on in the process of negotiation
It is not coincidental that these and several other major
contributions to the broader theoretical critique of
economistic household models (eg. Guyer 1981; Guyer
and Peters 1987) have come from Africanist scholars
confronted with household forms of mind-boggling
complexity
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rather than as norms that determine the outcome of
negotiation. Our strategies for linking household
and extra-household processes are somewhat differ-
Yet both of us argued that the question is not
simply what are rules governing intra-household
resource allocation, but rather how are gendered
rights and obligations constructed, maintained, and
made to appear 'natural' and, most importantly,
what are the conditions and modalities through
which particular groups of women interrogate and,
on occasion, overtly challenge prevailing gender
ideologies and arrangements. What, in other words,
are the emancipatory possibilities?
This, of course, raises fundamental questions of
subjectivity, identity, and resistance which have in
recent years been the focus of considerable debate.
4 Engendering Everyday
Resistance: Questions of Power
and Subjectivity
In the literature on household economics, much of
this debate has revolved around the question of
whether or not women suffer from false conscious-
ness. In his influential critique of economistic bar-
gaining models, Amartya Sen (1990) called into
question the foundational assumption of exogenous
preferences, and suggested that particularly in tra-
ditional societies women may be subject to a 'per-
ception bias' that takes inadequate account of their
own self-interest: 'insofar as intrafamily divisions
involve significant inequalities in the allotment of
food, medical attention, health care and the like
(often unfavorable to the well-being - even survival
- of women) the lack of perception of personal
interest combined with a great concern for family
welfare is, of course, just the kind of attitude that
helps to sustain the traditional inequalities' (Sen
1990: 126). He goes on to note that these percep-
tions are not immutable: 'the process of politicisa-
tion - including a political recognition of the gender
issue - can itself bring about sharp changes in these
perceptions, as can processes of economic change,
'° Moore develops what she calls the 'system of
redistribution', whereas I focus more directly on (a)
identifying the key arenas of social interaction in any
particular setting, and the ways in which struggles
reverberate across these arenas, and (b) linking these
local dynamics to larger configurations of
politicaleconomic forces.
such as women's involvement in so-called gainful
employment' (ibid.).
Sen has been taken to task from two quite opposite
directions. Prom an extreme poststructuralist posi-
tion, Apffel-Marglin and Simon (1994) accuse him
of 'feminist orientalism' and reifying liberal Western
notions of the autonomous subject; for these
authors, as for Spivak (1988), 'the subaltern cannot
speak.' Bina Agarwal (1994) in contrast is deeply
critical of Sen's assertion that women are unaware of
their self-interest, and turns instead to James Scott's
Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of
Peasant Resistance (1985). Scott's central theoret-
ical project is a critique of the Gramscian concept of
hegemony - the non-violent control through which
subaltern groups 'consent' to their own oppres-
sion." He does so, somewhat ironically, by invoking
the figure of the 'rational peasant' who is perfectly
capable not only of penetrating the self-serving
claims of the rich, but also manipulating and sub-
verting elements of the dominant ideology Agarwal
likewise argues that women are perfectly capable of
penetrating self-serving male ideologies. She criti-
cises Scott for casting his analysis in terms of class
rather than gender, but maintains that his concepts
and methods can be used to demonstrate women's
full awareness of their self-interest. Like Scott, she
provides detailed documentation of South Asian
women's 'off-stage' behaviour - including delicious
stories of clandestine picnics, rude songs about
male impotence, and so forth.
My own research in the Muda region of Malaysia
(the locus of Weapons of the Weak) suggests a
conceptualisation of agency quite different from
Scott's portrayal of the 'rational peasant' - a free-
willed, individual decision-maker with fixed and
unambiguous identity and interests (Hart 1991:
116-7). Attention to gender (and other forms of
In his incisive critique of Weapons of the Weak,
Mitchell (1990) argues that Scott dismisses Gramsci's
concept of hegemony through two problematic strategies.
First, Mitchell points out, Scott narrows the definition of
hegemony to domination at the level of ideas - which is
not the way Gramsci in fact uses the term. Scott then
draws a problematic distinction between the realm of
consciousness or culture, and some purely material or
physical realm, and uses this distinction to deny that
poor peasants are subject to hegemonic domination. The
second strategy entails rejecting evidence of hegemony by
relabelling its effects as external 'obstacles to resistance'.
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socially-constructed difference) calls for an under-
standing of agency that recognises multiple (and
possibly contradictory) sources of identity and
interests. Far from being given and fixed, identities
and interests are forged through political struggle
(in its extended sense) in multiple and intersecting
institutional arenas. Not only are men and women
differently positioned through the sexual division of
labour; in addition, these struggles are informed in
crucially important ways by multiple and often con-
flicting representations of masculinity/femininity
The picture of 'everyday resistance' that emerges
from this gendered understanding differs in several
key respects from that painted by Scott.
This alternative picture turns around striking differ-
ences between women and men in forms of labour
organisation that Scott himself documents, and were
clearly evident in the village where I lived in 1987.
While men were hired as individuals, women work-
ers organised and sold their labour collectively, defy-
ing efforts by large landowners to disband female
labour gangs. Male agricultural labour relations were
marked by at least outward signs of deference,
whereas women adopted a far more militant stance
towards large landowners. When the introduction of
combine harvesters threatened massive unemploy-
ment, women tried to boycott large landowners who
used the machine, whereas men resorted to clandes-
tine acts of sabotage. These gender-differentiated pat-
terns of engagement in the labour market and acts of
defiance were reciprocally linked with intra-house-
hold relations. For women workers, labour gangs
were a major source of financial as well as emotional
support which carried over to shape conjugal rela-
tions; their understandings of themselves and their
relations with their husbands contrasted sharply with
those of women belonging to a newly emergent mid-
dle class who defined themselves in terms of domes-
ticity and dependence on their husbands.
Yet, Mitchell argues, each of these 'obstacles' is more
usefully seen as historically constituted modes of
domination. What appear as externally given structures
or obstacles are the product of particular social practices:
'The new modes of power, by their permanence, their
apparent origin outside local life, their intangibility, their
impersonal nature, seem to take on an aspect of
difference, to stand outside actuality, outside events,
outside time, outside personhood' (Mitchell 1990: 569).
Accordingly, Mitchell argues, the dualism that opposes
meaning to material reality can be seen as the effect of
hegemonic strategies of power.
The question is why women were more capable
than men of asserting their identities as workers,
and how struggles in the workplace and the domes-
tic sphere intersected with one another. Part of the
explanation, I suggest, lies in women's exclusion
from a key arena - local systems of patronage that
operate predominantly along male lines. The cen-
trality of patronage, in turn, reflects larger configu-
rations of political-economic power. Relations
between peasants and the state in the main rice-
growing regions of Malaysia are not a matter of state
extraction. On the contrary the state pumps mas-
sive subsïdies into the major rice-growing regions in
an effort to contain the threat that militant Islamic
groups pose to the coalition in control of the state,
and to larger processes of accumulation. Subsidies
are channelled to local power brokers who then
deploy part of these resources to build and maintain
bases of political support. 'Poor peasants' can more
accurately be seen as male clients-cum-workers
enmeshed in complex, multi-faceted relations of
patronage that are deeply split along factional lines.
Most of the wives of these men were born outside
the village; not only are they excluded from patron-
age relations, but they explicitly identify with one
another as oran g luar - literally 'outside people.'
These gendered patterns of inclusion/exclusion
from patronage relations are only a part of the story
What is also crucial is the way men and women in
different class positions have become interpellated
very differently through supra-local gendered dis-
courses. Partly in response to the social dislocations
that accompanied rapid industrialisation and
urbanisation in the 1970s, state power in Malaysia
has increasingly been articulated in terms of reli-
gious rhetoric and symbolism, backed up by the
allocation of resources to state-sponsored Islamic
institutions. Gender has figured prominently in
struggles between the state and resurgent Islamic
forces. Ong (1990) provides an instructive analysis
of how definitions of Malay womanhood and the
family were actively promoted by a variety of state
agencies through a multiplicity of practices.
Through these discourses, constructions of women's
rightful position in the home runs parallel with the
principle of male responsibility, and with the
construction of men as more generously endowed
with akal (reason and self-control) than women.
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These official invocations of what it means to be
male and female do not determine people's under-
standing of themselves in any simple or direct way
but they do shape the terrain of debate and con-
tention on which these understandings are forged
through everyday practice. Working class women
were typically dismissive of notions of male respon-
sibility, in some instances openly derisive. These
women were confronted with a sharp disjuncture
between generalised notions of male responsibility,
and the imperatives of having to prepare the next
meal. Through daily practice, they developed not
only horizontal relations of solidarity with one
another, but also defined themselves in part
through a critique of official gender representations.
In striking contrast, middle class women - most
notably the wives of a newly emergent class of bro-
kers of state resources - not only invoked women's
rightful position in the home in defining themselves
as housewives, but also pressed claims of male
responsibility
In public discourse, the husbands of these women
frequently invoked their capacity to provide for
their families, and maintain domestic harmony - a
capacity they contrasted with the tension and con-
flict between poor couples which, in turn, they
attributed to the irresponsibility and inadequacies
of poor men. They were also fond of drawing analo-
gies between their role in providing for their wives
and their role in promoting village harmony
through their generosity towards the poor.
These emasculating discursive strategies are, I sug-
gest, an important part of the reason why male
workers were far less able than women to organise
collectively and to challenge employers directly in
the context of the labour process. Not only were
men incorporated into political patronage relations,
while women were largely excluded. In addition,
they were confronted with a principle that defined
them as superior to and responsible for women,
simultaneously with an incapacity to put this prin-
ciple into material practice in the domestic sphere.
The contradictions surrounding the construction of
men as superior, more responsible beings provided
economically and politically dominant men with a
wider array of controls over subaltern men than
over women. For poor men, it curtailed the realm of
argument and made them resort to more deferent,
manipulative, and indirect methods than did
women in their dealings with powerful men. By the
same token, women's reciprocal capacity to organise
collectively and to assert themselves in the domes-
tic realm is most usefully seen as the product of his-
torically-specific and geographically situated
interactions in multiple, intersecting institutional
arenas, and of the inseparability of meaning and
practice.
These simultaneously material and cultural strug-
gles provide concrete illustrations of more general
arguments suggested earlier. These include the
importance of gender as a constitutive force in
shaping economic processes; the usefulness of see-
ing 'the household' as a political arena; and the
ways in which struggles reverberate across different
institutional arenas, such that negotiation within
different sorts of households cannot be understood
in isolation from the ways in which both men and
women are engaged in other arenas and networks of
relationships. Larger configurations of political-eco-
nomic forces - including, as we saw, gendered dis-
courses - define the broad terrain of struggle,
although they do not in any unilateral way deter-
mine the outcomes; and these locally-generated
struggles in turn reconfigure supra-local forces.
Through a gendered critique of Weapons of the
Weak, I have also tried to show how recognition of
agency does not require the invocation of an
autonomous, pre-formed subject; on the contrary,
debates cast in terms of false consciousness versus
the self-interested, 'rational' subject are miscon-
ceived because both derive from a problematic sep-
aration between 'the material' and 'the ideological',
or between base and superstructure.2 In short, the
'struggles over resources/struggles over meaning'
couplet that is now very widely invoked should also
include struggles over identity in particular spatial
contexts - along with a recognition that places as
well as people are the product of these processes
(Massey 1994).
6 Concluding Observations
'The household' is the Achilles' heel of economism,
because it forces confrontation with questions of
gender and hence power. Although of necessity in a
Z The value of a Gramscian (or neo-Gramscian) approach formulations; for a brilliant statement of the
is that it provides a way of circumventing these dualistic contemporary relevance of Gramsci, see Hall (1986).
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very sketchy way, I have tried to suggest how a gen-
dered conception of the exercise of power in multi-
ple, intersecting institutional arenas points the way
towards an alternative processual understanding of
socio-spatial change.
This sort of understanding also illuminates how and
why discourses of 'the good mother' are so prob-
lematic, particularly when they are hitched to
poverty agendas and become both the legitimation
and condition for some sort of minimalist redistrib-
ution (cf. Jackson 1996). lt is not coincidental that
these models have become influential since the late
1980s, when the potentially disruptive effects of
austerity and the decimation of state welfare and
subsidies were becoming manifest in many parts of
the world, especially in Africa and Latin America.
Rather than victims of development (as in older
Women in Development narratives) or 'rotten
wives' subject to benevolent dictators (as in the uni-
tary household model), women are now being por-
trayed as individual agents with more desirable
preferences than men and hence, at least in some
circles, as better managers of poverty These sorts of
expert discourses, Nancy Fraser (1989: 174) notes,
'construe persons simultaneously as rational utility
maximisers and as causally conditioned, pre-
dictable, and manipulable objects, thereby screen-
ing out those dimensions of human agency that
involve the construction and deconstruction of
social meanings.' Yet predictive claims are a chimera
precisely because official efforts to channel
resources to 'poor women' are almost certain to pro-
voke new rounds of local contestation, the terms of
which are likely to be shaped by the discourses
themselves (cf. Moore 1992). Thus, for example,
Kandiyoti (1990) points out that 'in regions where
male responsibility is at least normatïvely present,
women themselves may be likely to put up fierce
resistance to measures by-passing the male house-
hold head, even though they may in practice con-
trive ways of increasing their own control over
household income.' It is also possible that 'good
mother' discourses will be disabling of women's
capacity to press for a better deal - although in
some instances the opposite may be the case. In
general, while 'poor women' may be treated as
instruments, they are unlike to act as intended. As
Ann Whitehead pointed out in her comments on an
earlier version of this paper, gender is a moving tar-
get precisely because gender power is constantly
reasserted.
In her recent book Justice Interruptus: Critical
Reflections on the 'Postsocialist' Condition
(1997), Nancy Fraser argues that gender is a 'biva-
lent' injustice, which encompass both gender-spe-
cific modes of economic marginalisation, and
gender-status devaluation or misrecognition.
Ameliorative strategies generate unintended effects
because claims for redistribution and recognition
impinge on one another. Thus, for example, ame-
liorative strategies of redistribution that leave intact
the deep structures of gender disadvantage must
make surface reallocations again and again:
The result is not only to underline gender dif-
ferentiation. It is also to mark women as defi-
cient and insatiable, as always needing more
and more. In time women can even come to
appear privileged, recipients of special treat-
ment and undeserved largesse. Thus, an
approach aimed at redressing injustices of
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